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ABSTRACT
It has now been more than 35 years since passage of the Section 2 results standard, and
how that standard applies to vote denial claims (e.g., claims involving voter identification)
remains extremely muddled. The Supreme Court has never ruled on a vote denial claim in
the context of the Section 2 results standard, and lower courts have struggled to develop a
workable framework. Yet it is now more imperative than ever to establish a workable
framework because Section 2 vote denial claims have become more prevalent in the wake of
the Court's 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. Holder. This Article proposes a judicially-
administrable framework for applying the Section 2 results standard to claims of vote deni-
al. In short, when applying Section 2 to such claims, a court should balance the government
interest in the election law against the harm to minority voters. If the government interest
outweighs the harm, the law should be upheld; however, if the harm outweighs the govern-
ment interest, the law should be struck down. Importantly, when doing so, courts should
generally only accept two justifications from the government-increasing the number of
ballots cast and increasing the accuracy of elections. On the flip side, when assessing harm
to minority voters, courts should almost exclusively focus on actual disfranchisement of
minority voters. In developing this framework, this Article discusses the history of the adop-
tion of the Section 2 results standard and demonstrates how the above framework adequate-
ly represents the compromise forged by liberals and conservatives in adopting that stand-
ard. It also details why the framework represents something better than what currently
exists and tackles potential objections to the proposal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
create a standard allowing plaintiffs to successfully challenge elec-
toral laws that have discriminatory "results."2 Development of the
results standard primarily stemmed from Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart's lead opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,3 which es-
tablished a stringent doctrine of discriminatory purpose for proving
1. C 2018. Vice Dean, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
Thanks to Bob Berman, Josh Douglas, and Ned Foley for their usual excellent comments.
2. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
3. 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
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racial and ethnic 4 (i.e., minority) vote dilution under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.5 Since the creation of the re-
sults standard, many successful lawsuits have been filed against
electoral structures such as at-large elections that dilute the votes of
minority citizens, and these lawsuits helped increase the number of
minority-elected officials at every level of government.6
But the Section 2 results standard does not just apply to electoral
laws that dilute minority votes; it also applies to electoral laws lead-
ing to "vote denial."7 Over the years, the types of electoral laws al-
leged to lead to Section 2 vote denial include, among other things,
voter purges,8 felon disfranchisement laws,' property ownership re-
quirements,o and the type of voting equipment employed at the polls
(for example, punch card machines)." Section 2 has also been applied
to what Ohio State's Daniel Tokaji termed the "new vote denial"' 2-
including such things as strict (generally photo) voter identification
laws 3 and changes to the early voting process.14
4. I employ the phrase "racial and ethnic" as a useful shorthand to describe the
groups protected by Section 2 because that phrase was used in one of the earliest Supreme
Court decisions involving voting rights for minority groups and because that decision aided
in the formulation of the results standard. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1973).
Technically, Section 2 prohibits discrimination "on account of race or color, or in contraven-
tion of the guarantees set forth in [S]ection 10303(f)(2)," with Section 10303(f)(2) covering
discrimination against "language minority group[s]." 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012); 52
U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2012).
5. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66.
6. See Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 903, 921 (2008) ("In the end, the amendment of [Section] 2 and its initial interpreta-
tion in Gingles significantly helped to foster the sea-change in descriptive representation
that has occurred over the last several decades.").
7. Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 746 (2016)
(defining vote dilution and vote denial); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Elec-
tion Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006) [hereinafter New
Vote Denial 1] (same); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of
Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
377, 416 (2012) ("[T]he Senate Report makes clear that an actionable harm arises when
minorities face improper barriers to participation at discrete junctures of the electoral pro-
cess, irrespective of whether this results in vote dilution.").
8. See Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28
F.3d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 1994).
9. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir. 1986).
10. See Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586,
588 (9th Cir. 1997).
11. See Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1515-16 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
12. New Vote Denial I, supra note 7, at 692; Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to
the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 440 (2015) [hereinafter New Vote
Denial 11].
13. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225-27 (5th Cir. 2016).
14. Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2014).
The procedural history of Husted is complicated and ultimately the decision was vacated.
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Yet the Section 2 results standard has always been an awkward
fit in the vote denial context, and courts have struggled with inter-
preting Section 2 in that realm. The awkward fit stems from the
fact that the results standard-while applicable to vote denial
claims-arose primarily out of a need for a new standard in vote dilu-
tion litigation, with the statutory language and legislative history of
Section 2 reflecting that almost singular focus.' 6 And while numerous
court decisions have dealt with the results standard in the vote dilu-
tion realm, far fewer adjudications (and not a single United States
Supreme Court decision!) have interpreted the results standard in
the vote denial context. 7 Thus, Section 2 vote denial claims still pre-
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of certain Ohio
voting laws for the 2014 election, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that preliminary injunc-
tion. Id. at 529. The Supreme Court then granted a stay of the preliminary injunction.
Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42, 42 (2014). Because granting the
stay vacated the operation of the preliminary injunction, the Sixth Circuit vacated its opin-
ion. Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). It is likely that the preliminary injunction approved in Husted was
stayed by the Supreme Court because of its timing-the preliminary injunction was issued
close to the election. New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 457 ("[T]he [Supreme Court]
decision is probably best understood . . . as reflecting the Court's concern about injunctions
issued very close to an election."). Regardless, whether Husted is technically "good law" or
not really does not matter to the citations to it and discussion of it in this Article. Indeed,
another Section 2 decision this Article cites several times has a similar history. In League
of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2014), the appellate
court reversed a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
certain North Carolina electoral laws and remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to issue a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court then stayed the Fourth
Circuit's mandate. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6, 6
(2014). Again, though, the Supreme Court's move likely was about timing, and whether
League of Women Voters is technically good law does not really matter to the citations to it
and discussion of it in this Article. Indeed, ultimately League of Women Voters resulted in a
declaration that North Carolina's package of electoral laws was adopted with a discrimina-
tory purpose. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 219 (4th Cir.
2016). Although, even the substantive validity of the Fourth Circuit's decision remains
vague. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400
("Given the blizzard of filings over who is and who is not authorized to seek review in this
Court under North Carolina law, it is important to recall our frequent admonition that
'[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case.' " (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))) (statement respecting
the denial of certiorari of Roberts, C.J.). Moreover, there is justification in citing these deci-
sions-even if technically not good law-because federal courts continue to cite these cases
favorably. See, e.g., Veasey, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Ohio Democratic
Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637-38 (6th Cir. 2016); Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst.
v. Johnson, 209 F. Supp. 3d 935, 942 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
15. Husted, 768 F.3d at 554 ("A clear test for Section 2 vote denial claims ... has yet
to emerge.").
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. League of Women Voters ofN.C., 769 F.3d at 239 ("Section 2's use to date has pri-
marily been in the context of vote-dilution cases."); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 752 (7th
Cir. 2014) ("[M]ost case law concerning the application of [Section] 2 concerns claims that
racial gerrymandering has been employed to dilute the votes of racial or ethnic groups.");
Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section
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sent a thorny problem for the federal courts even though the Section
2 results standard has been operable for more than thirty-five
years. "
While application of the Section 2 results standard to vote denial
claims is an old problem, it has taken on a new salience in recent
years. Bush v. Gore'9 refocused attention on election administration
issues in general. But the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County
v. Holder2 o essentially sent Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act into
permanent exile and seemingly sparked an increase in Section 2 vote
denial litigation. 21 Thus, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court
will one day consider a Section 2 vote denial claim-probably in the
near future-and when it does, the Court will essentially be writing
on a blank slate.2 2
This Article proposes adopting the following basic framework for
determining whether the Section 2 results standard has been violat-
ed in the vote denial context 23 : Balance the government interest in
the electoral law against the harm to minority voters-if the govern-
ment interest outweighs the harm, retain the electoral law; if the
harm outweighs the government interest, strike down the electoral
law.
While this is the big-picture sketch of the framework, many of the
finer details of the proposal are important. For instance, the frame-
2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 39 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 654-57 (2006) (surveying Section 2 cases and demonstrating that
the vast majority of cases were related to vote dilution); Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Con-
text of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 595 (2013) ("[T]he legal contours of vote
denial claims remain woefully underdeveloped as compared to vote dilution claims."); Pitts,
supra note 7, at 750 ("The approach [S]ection 2 takes to election laws that might deny the
ability to cast a countable ballot . . . is, to put it mildly, not nearly as well defined [as the
doctrine for vote dilution]."); New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 445 ("[T]he Supreme
Court has never decided a vote denial case under [section] 2's 'results' language.").
18. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012) ("[P]resent-day
'vote denial' cases are uncommon, and as such, courts have yet to develop a clear analytical
framework for this type of case, unlike the more common vote dilution claim.").
19. See 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000).
20. See 570 U.S. 592 (2013).
21. The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/effects-shelby-county-v-holder.
22. Because the Supreme Court will be writing on a blank slate, there are no foresee-
able thorny stare decisis issues with the analysis proposed in this Article. For a discussion
of potential stare decisis problems when interpreting Section 2, see Elmendorf, supra note
7, at 448-55.
23. I adhere to the view that it is unnecessary to prove vote dilution for a plaintiff to
prevail on a vote denial claim-a view that the majority of lower federal courts have taken.
Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 408 ("Most courts have held that Section 2 provides a cause of
action against participation injuries, whether or not the injury results in the tangible dilu-
tion of a minority community's voting strength.").
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work would prioritize a couple of government interests-enabling
more voters to cast ballots (increased access) and ensuring an accu-
rate result, often through rules that might prevent fraud or mistake.
On the other hand, the framework would only recognize the harm of
disfranchisement rather than burdens that do not actually result in
disfranchisement. And on both sides of the ledger, the framework
would demand more solid proof of these issues rather than theoreti-
cal benefits or harms.
The primary upsides of this approach, roughly in order of im-
portance, are:
* The proposed framework focuses the analysis on the two most
critical things we should care about when it comes to electoral
laws and their impact on minority voters: (i) how much inter-
est the government has in the electoral law, and (ii) how much
harm is being done to minority voters.
* It simplifies the standard from vague, confusing, and muddled
tests, such as "causation," that are currently employed by the
courts.
* It divorces the Section 2 standard from the idea that Section 2
violations only occur when they are traceable to historic and
societal discrimination.
The framework stems from several principles that need to be ac-
counted for when considering vote denial claims under the Section 2
results standard. First, Section 2 vote denial needs structure because
it essentially does not have any. Second, while Section 2 needs more
structure, the structure will never (and should never) lead to clear,
predictable outcomes. Section 2 is a statute born out of vote dilution
litigation, vague statutory language, and compromise-it will never be
mathematically precise. Third, because Section 2 resulted from a com-
promise between liberals and conservatives, any structure provided to
Section 2 can neither be so easy that plaintiffs who prove disparate
impact virtually always win, nor so difficult that plaintiffs are essen-
tially forced to prove purposeful discrimination to succeed. 24
My purpose in presenting this framework also is born from a view
that Section 2 vote denial jurisprudence should be simplified in a way
that serves to reflect what matters most in conducting elections: High
overall participation with accurate results while simultaneously en-
24. Any Section 2 vote denial standard must make room to allow governments to do
the following things that appear to be core values in our democracy: (i) disfranchise incar-
cerated felons, and (ii) retain age, citizenship, and residency requirements for voters. And
this makes sense because there is no evidence that Section 2 was intended to displace these
core eligibility requirements. Thus, the proposal in this Article would not apply in these
contexts.
2019] 5
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suring that racial and ethnic minority groups do not suffer unjustifi-
able harms in the process of achieving such a system. Thus, the
framework will, for instance, divorce Section 2 analysis from historic
discrimination and instead focus on current consequences. On the
other hand, the framework also will not simply readily accept any
government justifications for an electoral law and will value access
slightly more than accuracy and integrity. In the end, the framework
should give both liberals and conservatives some things to love and
some things to hate-and that is how a statute born out of compro-
mise should operate.
With those things in mind, it is clear that this Article is attempt-
ing to reverse-engineer a standard for Section 2. But that is really all
anyone can do. The statutory language and legislative history pro-
vide no clarity when it comes to applying Section 2 in the vote denial
context. We should be honest about that and embrace UC-Davis's
Chris Elmendorf's view of Section 2 as a statute that gives federal
judges license to create a common law of racially-fair elections.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II discusses the creation
of the Section 2 results standard and the problem the lower federal
courts have in developing an administrable doctrine in the vote deni-
al realm. Part III details a proposal to balance government interests
against the harm to minority voters, explains why the proposal pre-
sents a useful approach to Section 2 vote denial, and tackles potential
objections to the proposal.
II. SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN AND WHERE WE
STAND
The history behind adoption and initial Supreme Court applica-
tion of Section 2's results standard is fairly well known, but it is
worthwhile to traverse the highlights to make a couple of points rele-
vant to this Article's thesis. First, the adoption of the Section 2 re-
sults standard and its initial application by the Supreme Court in the
seminal case of Thorburg v. Gingles2 5 revolved almost entirely around
vote dilution litigation. Second, the Section 2 results standard con-
tains vague language that was a political compromise between liber-
als and conservatives.
After touring the basics surrounding adoption of the results
standard, this Article canvasses the Section 2 vote denial jurispru-
dence developed by the lower federal courts. What is clear is that the
courts have struggled to develop a coherent doctrine to separate vot-
ing laws that have a disparate impact and violate Section 2 from vot-
25. 478 U.S. 30 (1985).
[Vol. 46:1
2019] RETHINKING SECTION 2 7
ing laws that have a disparate impact and do not violate Section 2. In
drawing this line, courts have generally focused on requiring that a
plaintiff demonstrate causation in order to succeed on a vote denial
claim. However, determining what constitutes causation is somewhat
of a mystery.
A. A Brief History of Amended Section 2
Section 2, after its original passage within the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, did not play a major role.26 Instead, enforcement of the Vot-
ing Rights Act in the late-1960s primarily focused on other provisions
aimed specifically at guaranteeing the right to register to vote and
the right to cast a ballot free from discrimination.2 7 And in the
1970s-when voting rights litigation turned to so-called "second gen-
eration" claims of vote dilution-the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or Section 5 of the Act, rather than Section
2, provided the primary vehicles for litigating such claims. 28
Section 2 began its rise to prominence in 1980 when Justice Potter
Stewart issued his lead opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden.2 9 That
opinion held four important things in relation to Section 2 and its
future:
1) That Section 2 added nothing to a voting rights claim beyond
what the Fifteenth Amendment already served to prevent; 30
26. Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1352-53 (1983) (describing
Section 2 as "a little-used provision" and noting that Section 2 "had never been successfully
used as the basis for litigation").
27. See Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149-50 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); New Vote
Denial I, supra note 7, at 702 ("The VRA's immediate success was largely attributable to
Section 4, the centerpiece of the 1965 Act, which temporarily suspended literacy tests. The
deployment of federal examiners under Sections 6 through 8 of the VRA was also critical in
helping to register eligible black voters." (footnotes omitted)).
28. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 130 (1976) (involving vote dilution under
Section 5); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 755 (1973) (involving vote dilution under the
constitution); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 127 (1971) (involving vote dilution under
the constitution); Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 242 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]his
court knows of no successful dilution claim expressly founded on [Section 2].").
29. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
30. Id. at 61 ("In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear legislative
history, it is evident that this statutory provision adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth
Amendment claim."). As originally adopted in 1965, Section 2 read as follows: "No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color." Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. The Fifteenth Amendment reads, in relevant part: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
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2) That the Fifteenth Amendment contained a discriminatory-
purpose standard;3 '
3) That the Fifteenth Amendment only applied to claims of vote
denial and did not apply to claims of vote dilution; 32 and
4) That the Fourteenth Amendment embodied a stringent discrim-
inatory-purpose standard for vote dilution claims.3 3
In combination, these four holdings rendered Section 2 ineffective
for vote dilution litigation, ineffective as a separate standard (from
the Fifteenth Amendment) for vote denial litigation, and, as will be
discussed momentarily, made vote dilution claims more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove.
Bolden sparked a great uproar due to its negative impact on a
plaintiffs ability to win a vote dilution claim. 34 Bolden's critics
thought Justice Stewart's opinion created a situation where minority
plaintiffs filing vote dilution claims would be unable to secure victory
as easily as they had in the past.35 In part, this was because Bolden
"appear[ed] to have abandoned . . . [a] totality of circumstances test
and to have replaced it with a requirement of specific evidence [of
intent]" that amounted to a "requirement of [providing proof of] a
smoking gun." 3 6
Bolden's critics turned to Congress and an amendment to Section
2 as a means to reverse the harm rendered by the decision to vote
dilution plaintiffs. The amendment to Section 2 would create a statu-
tory "results" standard that would obviate the need for plaintiffs to
prove a constitutional claim of discriminatory purpose in vote dilu-
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
31. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65.
32. Id. at 65.
33. Id. at 66 (describing the "basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimina-
tion can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
34. Boyd & Markman, supra note 26, at 1355 ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Mobile produced an avalanche of criticism, both in the media and within the civil rights
community.").
35. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 621 (4th ed. 2012) (describing the reaction to Bolden by voting
rights lawyers and civil rights advocates).
36. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 199 (1982)
(statement of Sen. Mathias); see also Boyd & Markman, supra note 26, at 1404 ("Propo-
nents of the results test repeatedly characterized the intent standard as requiring direct
evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent, such as overt statements of bigotry or evi-
dence of a 'smoking gun.' " (footnotes omitted) (quoting Memorandum from Ralph Neas,
Executive Director, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, on Amending Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act (Jan. 26, 1982), reprinted in Senate Hearings)).
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tion litigation. And this "results" standard would enable plaintiffs to
win more easily.
But shifting Section 2 from a stringent purpose standard to an
easier-to-satisfy results standard was controversial. 37 The focus of
contention concerned whether the results standard created a right of
proportional representation in vote dilution litigation. 38 Whereas op-
ponents of the results standard thought it created such a right, pro-
ponents of the results standard said it did not create a right to pro-
portional representation but refrained from clearly articulating ex-
actly what sort of right the results standard created. 39
In an attempt to resolve the controversy and provide additional
guidance regarding interpretation of the results standard, Senator
Bob Dole proposed additional statutory language that described the
results standard in greater detail.40 But the adoption of Senator
Dole's language did little to end the ambiguity. 4' As the leading
commentators on the history of the adoption of the Section 2 results
standard have noted, "[t]he Dole proposal effectively supplied a polit-
ical resolution to misgivings about section 2. It did not, however, put
to rest the considerable confusion over what the compromise ulti-
mately was intended to mean." 4 2
Despite the controversy, Congress adopted-and President Ronald
Reagan signed into law-a discriminatory results standard for Sec-
tion 2.43 This results standard would be violated when:
[B]ased on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the politi-
cal processes leading to nomination or election in the State or po-
litical subdivision are not equally open to participation by mem-
37. See Boyd & Markman, supra note 26, at 1396-1401.
38. Id. at 1390-94, 1397-1403; see also id. at 1397-98 ("[T]he critical issue in the entire
debate was whether the results test would lead to a political regime in which proportional
representation of racial and ethnic groups became the standard on which voting rights
violations would be predicated." (footnote omitted)).
39. See id. at 1399-1400.
40. Id. at 1414-15.
41. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (2008) (describing how "there has been considerable disagreement about the
precise meaning of [the results] standard").
42. Boyd & Markman, supra note 26, at 1416.
43. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). The full text of Section 2's subsection (a), which contains
the results standard, reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guar-
antees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012).
2019] 9
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bers of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the elec-
torate to participate in the political process and to elect represent-
atives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision
is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a pro-
tected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.4 4
Importantly, though, this vague statute represented a deal forged
by liberals and conservatives. While the Democratic Party controlled
the House, Republicans controlled the Senate. And Republican
Ronald Reagan was President. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor not-
ed in the Supreme Court's first Section 2 results standard decision,
the statute amounts to "compromise legislation."4 5
So the basic story thus far is that in 1982 Section 2 was amended
to create a statutory results standard for vote dilution litigation that
was intended to make it easier for plaintiffs to succeed than the con-
stitutional discriminatory-purpose standard created a couple years
earlier by Justice Stewart's Bolden opinion. However, lawmakers did
not want the results standard to create a right to proportional repre-
sentation. Beyond that, though, Congress provided little definitive
guidance about enforcement of the results standard. In essence, Con-
gress enacted the results standard and then punted it to the federal
courts to make some sense out of it.
Four years after adoption of the results standard, the Supreme
Court weighed in by creating a two-step doctrinal framework for vote
dilution claims in Thornburg v. Gingles.46 To succeed on a claim, the
first step requires a plaintiff to prove that:
i) The minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district";
ii) The minority group "is politically cohesive"; and
iii) "[T]he white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-
in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority can-
didate running unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's pre-
ferred candidate." 4 7
44. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
45. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 84 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
46. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 79 (1986); Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d. 667,
675 (S.D. Tex. 2017) ("In Gingles, the Supreme Court established a two-step analysis for
vote-dilution claims.").
47. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see also id. at
48-49 ("Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat candi-
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These three elements of a plaintiffs Section 2 vote dilution claim
have subsequently become colloquially known as the "Gingles pre-
conditions."4 8
The second step involves an overall assessment of the "totality of
the circumstances." 4 9 A court assesses the totality of circumstances
with reference to a number of factors listed as relevant in the Senate
Report that accompanied creation of the results standard in 1982.50
These so-called "Senate factors" are:
i) "[T]he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or po-
litical subdivision";
ii) "[T]he extent to which voting in the elections of the State or po-
litical subdivision is racially polarized";
iii) "[T]he extent to which the State or political subdivision has
used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the op-
portunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and
prohibitions against bullet voting";
iv) "[T]he exclusion of members of the minority group from candi-
date slating processes";
v) "[T]he extent to which minority group members bear the effects
of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment,
and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process";
vi) "[T]he use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political cam-
paigns"; and
vii) "[T]he extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.""
dates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group." (cita-
tion omitted)).
48. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993); cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1006 (1994) (describing the "three threshold conditions for a dilution
challenge").
49. Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1115 (3d Cir.
1993) ("[E]ven after a court has determined that the plaintiffs proved each of the Gingles
factors, it must go on to consider whether the totality of circumstances . . . establishes that
the particular voting scheme diminishes the minority group's opportunity fully to partici-
pate in the political process.").
50. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1500 (2008) ("Once the preconditions
are satisfied, a court is still required to engage in a multifactor balancing inquiry (focusing
on the factors identified in the 1982 Senate Report) before determining whether vote dilu-
tion exists. In other words, [Section] 2 doctrine is formally structured as a two-stage in-
quiry . ." (footnote omitted)).
51. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45.
2019] 11
12 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In addition, two other factors "may have probative value"":
viii) "[E]iected officials are unresponsive to the particularized
needs of the members of the minority group"; and
ix) "[lT]he policy underlying the State's or the political subdivision's
use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous."53
But these Senate factors are not necessarily the exclusive factors
to consider in evaluating the totality of the circumstances in vote
dilution claims. After all, when one engages in a totality of circum-
stances analysis, pretty much anything goes. Moreover, in Johnson
v. De Grandy, the Supreme Court explicitly mandated consideration
of at least one other factor-"proportionality"-in the totality of cir-
cumstances analysis for vote dilution claims. 54
At this point, though, it is crucial to emphasize that this entire
discussion-from the decision in City of Mobile to the congres-
sional debate over amending Section 2 that created a results
standard to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the results
standard in Gingles-revolves entirely around vote dilution litiga-
tion. None of this discussion has any direct implications for vote
denial litigation.5 5
The problem, then, is to develop a framework for adjudicating
vote denial claims under the Section 2 results standard in light of
the almost nonexistent guidance Congress provided in this realm
and in light of the notion that Section 2 represents vague compro-
mise legislation between liberals and conservatives.5 6 As will be
highlighted, lower federal courts have struggled to develop a Gin-
gles'-type, or even any type of, coherent framework for vote denial
claims.
52. Id. at 45.
53. Id.
54. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (holding that "proportionali-
ty . . . is a relevant fact in the totality of circumstances").
55. See New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 443 ("Congress was primarily focused on
vote dilution rather than vote denial at the time it considered and adopted the 1982
amendment to [Section] 2.").
56. No one questions whether the Section 2 results standard applies to vote denial. S.
REP. NO. 97-417, at 30, 30 n.119 (noting that Section 2 prohibits "all voting rights discrim-
ination" and mentioning discriminatory absentee balloting and purge procedures as viola-
tions of Section 2); New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 442 ("[T]he text and legislative
history leave no doubt that [Section] 2's 'results' language applies to both vote denial and
vote dilution claims."). Even Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, arguably the
Court's most conservative member, concedes that Section 2's results standard applies to
vote denial claims. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 914-45 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that Section 2 only applies to "enactments that regulate citizens' access to the ballot or the
processes for counting a ballot").
[Vol. 46:1
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B. The Primary Problem with the Vote Denial Precedents: A Focus
on the Elusive Notion of Causation
Since 1982, the lower federal courts have tried to develop a
framework for adjudicating Section 2 vote denial claims. But the
framework is highly unsatisfactory in that, in essence, the decisions
amount to a court declaring some electoral law to violate or not vio-
late Section 2 without a clear understanding of exactly why the court
has reached that conclusion. The main culprit here-at least from the
standpoint of the judicial doctrine that has developed"-is the notion
of "causation" initially created by the lower courts in the 1980s and
1990s. This has continued to be perpetuated by the most recent deci-
sions of the federal courts in hot-button areas such as voter identifi-
cation and reduced early voting hours.
In applying the Section 2 results standard to vote denial claims,
the lower courts have generally started with a fairly unassailable and
unobjectionable premise: The standard should not be employed to
strike down every electoral law that disparately impacts minority
voters. Thus, lower federal courts often, quite rightfully, make pro-
nouncements along the lines of "a showing of disproportionate racial
impact alone does not establish a per se violation [of Section 2].""
And this makes perfect sense. A fair review of the statutory language
and legislative history of amended Section 2 makes it difficult to take
the position that every electoral law having a disparate impact on
57. The main culprit is a Congress that provided little guidance on the meaning of the
Section 2 results standard generally and, particularly, in the vote denial realm.
58. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Frank v. Walker,
768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[Section 2] does not condemn a voting practice just be-
cause it has a disparate effect on minorities."); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc.,
133 S.Ct. 2247 (2013) (noting that a Section 2 claim "based purely on a showing of some
relevant statistical disparity between minorities and whites . . . will be rejected") (quoting
Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir.
1997)); Smith, 109 F.3d at 595 ("[A] bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on
a racial minority does not satisfy the [Section] 2 'results' inquiry."); Brown v. Detzner, 895
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (noting that a plaintiff needs to "demonstrate
something more than disproportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation"). In recent
years, several federal courts have described the need to prove a disparate impact as the
first step to proving a Section 2 violation in the vote denial context. League of Women Vot-
ers of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) ("First, the challenged
standard, practice, or procedure must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a
protected class, meaning that members of the protected class have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. (quoting Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d
524, 553 (6th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d
216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016); Husted, 768 F.3d at 554. While some of these cases may not tech-
nically be good law, see supra note 14, they merely restate what lower courts appear to
have always required.
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minority voters creates a statutory violation." Congress does not ap-
pear to have intended such an extreme result, and it does not appear
that any commentator has adopted such an extreme position. Re-
member, the Section 2 results standard was a compromise between
liberals and conservatives where vote denial was barely a considera-
tion, so it would be surprising to interpret the statute as outlawing
all electoral practices that have any sort of disparate impact.
Because Section 2 vote denial claims are rarely brought without
some proof of disparate impact on minority voters,"o the key question
in such litigation often becomes what more, aside from a disparate
impact on minority voters, is necessary to prove a Section 2 viola-
tion? 6' The answer to that question from the lower courts appears to
be that plaintiffs need to prove "causation."6 2 But it is not clear exact-
ly what this causation requirement entails. As Ohio State's Dan To-
kaji has written: "There is a general consensus that some showing of
59. One could contend that this intent is implied from the statutory language of
Section 2 which notes that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members
of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 52
U.S.C. § 10301(b). An interpretation of Section 2 that outlawed any electoral practice
with a disproportionate impact would seemingly be the vote denial equivalent of enforc-
ing proportional representation.
60. For a few outlier examples of instances where plaintiffs have been unable to
provide adequate proof of disparate impact, see Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 627-29 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding plaintiffs failed to
prove disparate impact related to Ohio laws governing absentee and provisional bal-
lots); Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 639-40 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding
plaintiffs failed to provide statistical evidence of disparate impact); Gonzalez v. Arizo-
na, 677 F.3d 383, 406-07 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding plaintiffs failed to prove
disparate impact of voter identification law on Latino voters); Stewart v. Blackwell,
356 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795, 798, 807-08 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (appearing to find no proof of
disparate impact in Ohio's use of punch card ballots). The decision in Stewart was
ultimately vacated by the Sixth Circuit. Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692, 694 (6th
Cir. 2007).
61. See New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 448 (noting the courts' "general
agreement that 'something more' than a mere disparate impact should be required to
prevail, but disagreement over what that something more should be" (footnote omitted)
(quoting Nicholas 0. Stephanopolous, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 55, 108)).
62. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 405 (noting that "proof of 'causal connection be-
tween the challenged voting practice and a prohibited discriminatory result' is crucial")
(quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595); Smith, 109 F.3d at 595 (Section 2 plaintiffs need to
demonstrate a "causal connection between the challenged voting practice and [a] prohib-
ited discriminatory result") (emphasis added) (quoting Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the
City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)); Ortiz, 28 F.3d at
310 n.4 (to prevail on a Section 2 claim a plaintiff "must demonstrate and establish by
evidence that the particular [electoral] practice causes the alleged discrimination") (em-
phasis added); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP.
CT. REV. 55, 60 ("Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to demonstrate not only that
a statistical disparity exists between minorities and whites, but also that a franchise
restriction interacts with social and historical conditions to cause the disparity." (empha-
sis added)).
2019] RETHINKING SECTION 2 15
causation is required for plaintiffs to prevail on a [section] 2 claim.
There are differences among courts, however, in what they think
causation means." 6 3
After reading the cases in this realm, it seems like causation
serves as an all-purpose label that lower federal courts place on
their ultimate conclusion as to whether a particular electoral law
violates Section 2. In other words, if a court desires to find that an
electoral law does not violate Section 2, it will conclude that plain-
tiffs have not proved causation; on the other hand, if a court wants
to find that an electoral law violates Section 2, it will conclude that
plaintiffs have proved causation. Put plainly, decisions on causation
seem akin to the old standard for proving obscenity-courts know it
when they see it.
For instance, consider a couple of appellate court cases where cau-
sation was not found. In these cases-one involving felon disfran-
chisement and the other involving registered voters being purged for
not voting-causation was not found, at least in part, because of the
legitimate government interests in disfranchising felons and purging
voters to prevent fraud, respectively. 64 Both of those cases also down-
played historical discrimination and lower socioeconomic status (the
combination of which this Article sometimes refers to as "societal dis-
crimination") for minority voters in their causation analyses.6 1 In-
63. New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 451. We can say with some certainty that
one thing the "causation" requirement is not is a requirement that merely mandates a
showing of "but for" causation. In other words, Section 2's causation requirement does not
simply entail demonstrating that the alleged vote denial would disappear through elimina-
tion of the challenged electoral law. If that were the case, the causation requirement would
be relatively simple to understand and implement.
64. In Wesley v. Collins, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Tennessee had a legitimate
and compelling rationale for felon disfranchisement because such disfranchisement is au-
thorized by the Fourteenth Amendment and because it made sense to "decide that perpe-
trators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws,
the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations,
or the judges who are to consider their cases." 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986). In
Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter Registration Division,
the Third Circuit noted that purge statutes were a legitimate tool to prevent fraud, espe-
cially in light of evidence of voter fraud in Philadelphia. 28 F.3d at 314, 316-17. It also not-
ed that citizens were purged for not voting without regard for their minority status. Id.
65. In Wesley, the Sixth Circuit noted that while Tennessee had a history of discrimi-
nation whose effects continued to the present day, such past discrimination could not "in
the manner of original sin, condemn action that is not in itself unlawful." Wesley, 791 F.2d
at 1261 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Ortiz, in finding a lack of causation, the Third Circuit majority rejected the
position of the dissent which "argue[d] at great length that societal conditions-
discrimination in housing, education, wages, etc-constitute a totality of the circumstanc-
es with which the practice (the purge law) interacts to create inequality (discrimination)."
Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 315. The Third Circuit majority responded:
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stead, both decisions placed the blame for vote denial on those im-
pacted by the electoral practices at issue either because they had
committed a crime (in the case of felon disfranchisement)66 or because
they had failed to vote (in the case of the purge for not voting).6 1
In contrast, other appellate court decisions appear to find causa-
tion primarily based on the type of evidence rejected in the cases
mentioned in the previous paragraph. For instance, one decision
involving a challenge to the reduction of early voting days and
hours found causation from historic and current socioeconomic ine-
qualities- 6 a position apparently rejected in previous cases men-
tioned above that downplayed those factors.69 Another case involved
a challenge to the elimination of same-day registration and a
change in state law that prevented votes cast at the wrong precinct
from being tabulated.o In that instance, the appellate court found
causation by relying primarily on the history of voting-related dis-
crimination, socioeconomic disparities between white and minority
voters, and the "tenuousness of the reasons given for the re-
strictions." 7 Again, such reliance on societal discrimination cuts
against other court decisions related to causation.
[T]he individuals to whom the purge law applies apparently have surmounted
and overcome the societal disadvantages which [the dissent] emphasizes, and
have registered to vote at least once, if not more often. Had they continued to
do so, the purge law could not have affected them, inasmuch as the purge law
operates against only those who have registered to vote at least once, but then
do not vote or register again.
Id. at 315-16 (footnote omitted).
66. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 ("[O]nly the commission of a preascertained, proscribed act
warrants the state of Tennessee to foreclose a certain individual from the voting pro-
cess . . . . [Felons are disenfranchised] because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal
act for which they assume the risks of detention and punishment." (emphasis added)).
67. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 315-16 (noting that if the purged voters "had . . . continued to
[vote], the purge law could not have affected them, inasmuch as the purge law operates
against only those who have registered to vote at least once, but then do not vote or regis-
ter again."). UC-Davis' Chris Elmendorf refers to this mode of analysis as the "voter fault"
defense. Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 408-09.
68. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 556 (6th Cir. 2014)
(finding causation in large part because "African Americans in Ohio tend to be of lower-
socioeconomic status because of 'stark and persistent racial inequalities .. . [in] work, hous-
ing, education and health,' inequalities that stem from 'both historical and contemporary
discriminatory practices.' ") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
70. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 229-30 (4th Cir.
2014). Again, while technically the decision was vacated, it does help demonstrate that
courts are all over the map with their causation analysis.
71. Id. at 245-46.
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In my opinion, causation, as it has thus far been applied by lower
federal courts, does not provide much help as a guiding principle.
Take the very real-world instance of a state law requiring a voter to
provide government-issued photo identification as a condition for
casting a countable ballot. On the one hand, a court could look at evi-
dence of societal discrimination and find that requiring voters to pro-
duce photo identification amounts to proof of causation that renders
the law invalid under Section 2. Indeed, at least one appellate court
basically did just that.7 3 On the other hand, a court could say that if
those who desire to vote do not take the time to secure adequate pho-
to identification, then it is their own fault for not voting, and no cau-
72. Dan Tokaji seems to view some recent decisions as providing more structure to the
Section 2 inquiry. See New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 463 ("Lower courts have strug-
gled to come up with a workable framework for adjudicating [Section] 2 claims . . . [but
t]here has been significant progress in the most recent set of decisions."). I disagree. A few
recent, influential appellate court decisions have described the Section 2 vote denial stand-
ard as follows:
* First, "the challenged 'standard, practice, or procedure' must impose a dis-
criminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members of
the protected class 'have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.'"
* Second, that burden "must in part be caused by or linked to 'social and his-
torical conditions' that have or currently produce discrimination against mem-
bers of the protected class."
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 240 (quoting Ohio State Conference of NAACP
v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 553 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244
(5th Cir. 2016); Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 768 F.3d at 554. Of course, as mentioned
above, a couple of these decisions are technically not good law. See supra note 14. But much
more importantly and substantively, these two prongs are not viewed much differently, if
at all, from what previous courts were doing. The first prong essentially requires proof of a
disparate impact on minority voters. See supra note 55. The second prong is the causation
requirement. Indeed, the second prong uses the word "caused." Moreover, the court that
created this two-pronged test admitted that the second factor is "causation." See, e.g., Ohio
State Conference of NAACP, 768 F.3d at 554 n.9 ("In the few cases considering vote denial
claims, this second factor has often been expressed as a 'causation' requirement, or through
statements that a plaintiff cannot establish a Section 2 violation merely by showing a dis-
proportionate impact or burden."). While the court has created a two-step test and this has
the appearance of more structure, the second step appears to be the same old vague causa-
tion analysis with the word "[s]econd" in front of it. Moreover, a later opinion from the
Sixth Circuit contains a muddled, confusing discussion of the two-step analysis that ap-
pears to rely heavily on what might be viewed as the "traditional" notion of causation. See
Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 637-39 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[A] Section 2 vio-
lation [occurs] only if [an electoral law] is shown to causally contribute, as it interacts with
social and historical conditions that have produced discrimination, to a disparate impact on
African Americans' opportunity to participate in the political process.").
73. See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 257-64 (upholding district court finding of a Section 2 vio-
lation based on analysis involving poverty caused by racial discrimination). Veasey involved
discussion of several Senate factors in its analysis. That discussion covers about seven full
pages in the Federal Reporter with about four of the seven pages analyzing the history of
discrimination and the effect of past discrimination. See id.
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sation exists. And, not surprisingly given the malleability of causa-
tion analysis, another appellate court basically took that approach.7
Indeed, one can take many electoral requirements that may have
a disproportionate impact on minority voters and frame the causation
inquiry so it comes out either way. For example, take the elimination
of early voting hours. On the one hand, you could use a causation
analysis that focuses on societal discrimination and find that a reduc-
tion in early voting hours causes disfranchisement. On the other
hand, you could use a causation analysis that focuses on the fault of
the voters and finds no causation because it is the voters' fault for not
using whatever early voting hours remain or for not using election-
day voting hours." To take another example, assume racial dispari-
ties in the error rates of voting equipment.7 6 On the one hand, you
74. See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding that it is not a
violation of Section 2 when the government "extends to every citizen an equal opportuni-
ty to get a photo ID" and minority voters "are less likely to use that opportunity"). In
discussing these last two cases, they are painted with a broad brush. In both instances,
the courts do not rely on any single reason for their Section 2 decisions, and this Article
is trying to glean what factors seem to be doing the most work. Thus, the analysis here
could be subject to criticism that it is not considering the totality of either opinion. But
that is just the point-these cases deal with very similar issues, very similar facts, very
similar analysis, and end up going in the opposite direction, ultimately leading to the
conclusion that no real structure exists for Section 2 vote denial claims. In many ways,
what the courts have been doing in Section 2 vote denial claims mimics Chris Elmen-
dorf's description of vote dilution jurisprudence under White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
766 (1973):
But the dictate of White is only this: (1) duly note that vote dilution claims re-
quire "evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomi-
nation and election were not equally open to participation by the group in ques-
tion," (2) make findings regarding the presence or absence of any number of
factors related to present and past discrimination against minorities, minority
political participation, minority representation, and the nuts and bolts of the
electoral system at issue, and (3) conclude with an unexplained normative
judgment about whether the findings, viewed in totality, warrant a federal
court order replacing the challenged electoral arrangements with something
more to the plaintiffs' liking....
Thus . . . state electoral practices shall be reformed on the basis of the indi-
vidual judge's unstated sentiments and beliefs about racial fairness. District
judges could be reversed, of course, but only by appellate judges making simi-
larly unexplained normative calls.
Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 412-13 (footnotes omitted) (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 766).
75. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2183 (2015) (recog-
nizing the availability of a voter-fault argument in the context of the reduction of early
voting hours).
76. Not an inconceivable assumption. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Elec-
tronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1743 (2005) (discussing
voting equipment that has a disproportionate impact on minority voters).
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could say that societal discrimination causes some voters not to cast
a countable ballot. On the other hand, you could blame the voters for
not paying appropriate attention to correctly using the machine to
ensure they cast a countable ballot. A court's view of causation will
be contingent on whatever focus the judge making the decision wish-
es to emphasize."
Perhaps because of the elusive nature of the causation analysis, a
few courts have tried to bring more order to the vote denial analysis
in recent years by emphasizing the importance of some of the Senate
factors from Gingles-essentially elevating some Senate factors to a
higher status than other Senate factors.7 8 The Ninth Circuit noted
that the factors relevant to a plaintiffs claim challenging a voter
identification law were:
[T]he history of official state discrimination against the minority
with respect to voting, the extent to which voting in the state is ra-
cially polarized, and "the extent to which members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of dis-
crimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process."7 9
And the Sixth Circuit held that Senate factors one (history of official
discrimination in voting), three (enhancing devices), five (effects of
discrimination in education, employment, and health that hinders
political participation), and nine (whether the policy underlying the
election rule is tenuous) are particularly relevant to vote denial
claims.so
But trying to emphasize a few of the Senate factors likely will not
help the analysis much either.8 ' For starters, these courts do not even
77. Professor Tokaji appears to take the view that lower courts' consideration of the
importance of social and historical conditions to finding a Section 2 vote denial violation is
something apart from the causation inquiry. New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 454-55.
The reading of the cases here is that everything is intertwined. But the difference between
Professor Tokaji's reading and the reading here may not matter because there is agree-
ment that little clarity exists in how the courts arrive at decisions in the realm of Section 2
vote denial.
78. At least one district court has explicitly rejected use of the Senate factors in a
Section 2 vote denial analysis. See Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 n.13
(M.D. Fla. 2012) (noting the Senate factors were of "limited usefulness" for vote denial
claims). This decision, though, is an outlier. Moreover, the district court replaced the Sen-
ate factors with an open-ended "totality of the circumstances" inquiry. Id. Thus, eliminat-
ing use of the Senate factors did not appear to add much clarity to the situation.
79. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405-06 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986)).
80. Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 555 (6th Cir. 2014).
81. In describing the disarray of Section 2 vote denial decisions, the University of
Chicago's Nick Stephanopoulos writes:
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entirely agree on what the most important Senate factors are. In ad-
dition, to the extent these courts have agreed on what is most im-
portant, the most important factors are a history of discrimination
and the effects of discrimination as witnessed through lower socioec-
onomic status. But a history of discrimination and lower socioeco-
nomic status seem likely to be found everywhere with a significant
minority population-whether it be North Carolina, Texas, Florida,
Wisconsin, or Ohio.8 2 So if the focus falls on those Senate factors,
there would seem to be almost no limiting principle on Section 2. Just
prove a disparate impact, a history of discrimination, and a lower so-
cioeconomic status (that is, societal discrimination), and the plaintiff
wins.
But societal discrimination plus disparate impact probably cannot
be the test because it trends too far to the liberal view of voting
rights. For instance, it is hard to think that conservatives who adopt-
ed Section 2 in 1982 (President Reagan) thought they were embrac-
ing a formula where societal discrimination plus disparate impact
would equal a finding of vote denial under the results test. Moreover,
the reality is that it is hard to believe the current conservative Su-
preme Court would endorse a standard where societal discrimination
plus disparate impact equals a Section 2 violation. 83
Some courts require proof of proximate causation, that is, proof that the fran-
chise restriction at issue is directly responsible for the disparity between mi-
norities and whites. If some other factor is significantly implicated-for exam-
ple, lack of minority interest in the election, poverty unrelated to discrimina-
tion, a different electoral regulation not contested in the litigation-then a Sec-
tion 2 claim cannot succeed. Other courts focus on the interaction between the
franchise restriction and social or historical patterns of discrimination. They
grant relief only when the restriction's disproportionate impact occurs because
of such an interaction, for example, if discrimination is responsible for minori-
ties' lesser education, which in turn makes them more likely to misuse compli-
cated voting machines. And still other courts demand not just a statistical dis-
parity but also the satisfaction of relevant factors from the 1982 Senate report.
Responsiveness to minority concerns, a legacy of discrimination, and socioeco-
nomic differences are the factors these courts most often have examined.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 62, at 108-09 (footnotes omitted). While I might characterize it
slightly differently-because I think that all three of these methods fall within the "causa-
tion" doctrine-there is not much of a gulf between the discord Professor Stephanopoulos
sees in the doctrine and the views expressed here.
82. See id. at 110 ("[T]he usual reason why a restriction disproportionately affects
minorities is that they are poorer or less educated, and the usual reason why they are
poorer or less educated is a history of discrimination. It thus will be straightforward in
many cases to show that a restriction's interaction with discriminatory conditions gives
rise to the disparate impact.").
83. Moreover, a less conservative Supreme Court might not even endorse such an
analysis. To borrow from the vote dilution context, a focus on finding vote denial violations
based primarily on societal discrimination might run into what could be termed the "De
Grandy problem." See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994). When vote dilu-
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But let us return to the main point: Section 2 vote denial doctrine
is, to put it kindly, vague. And there is widespread agreement among
commentators that current Section 2 vote denial doctrine is underde-
veloped and muddled. 4 Less charitably, it is a mess. And, at the end
of the day, the most important point here for this thesis is just that-
Section 2 vote denial doctrine needs a better structure; but it also
needs a structure faithful to the compromise forged in 1982."
III. A BETTER WAY: Focus SOLELY ON JUSTIFICATIONS AND HARMS
When it comes to Section 2 vote denial litigation, the doctrine is a
mess. Because the doctrine is a mess, it should be simplified to focus
on what is most important in relation to conducting fair elections:
Whether the benefit of the electoral regulation at issue outweighs the
harm to minority voters. Within this basic framework, though, courts
should embrace several more principles. First, courts should give top
priority to certain types of harms and certain types of benefits. When
it comes to harms, courts should prioritize the raw number of minori-
ty voters disfranchised by the law over evidence of disproportionate
tion litigation began, plaintiffs would challenge at-large or multi-member election systems
where virtually no minority candidates had ever been elected. Proving a violation in such a
place basically involved demonstrating the Gingles preconditions plus societal discrimina-
tion-which was not particularly difficult in most places with at-large elections and no
minority elected officials. But then the context became tougher when the challenges moved
to single-member districts that provided some, but not the maximum possible, descriptive
representation for minority voters. The lower court in De Grandy embraced what had be-
come the traditional analysis-Gingles preconditions plus societal discrimination equals
Section 2 vote dilution violation. But the Supreme Court overwhelmingly balked at that
sort of analysis, making it harder for plaintiffs to win vote dilution challenges in the con-
text of single-member districting that already provided some descriptive representation to
minority voters. See id. at 1009. The only members of the Supreme Court to dissent in De
Grandy were Justices Thomas and Scalia, whose dissent was premised on their view that
Section 2 does not apply to vote dilution claims at all. See id. at 1031-32 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). And, at the end of the day, a vote denial analysis focusing solely on disparate
impact plus societal discrimination could well suffer a similar fate.
84. See, e.g., Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 75, at 2183 (describing Section 2 vote-
denial case law as "inchoate"); Nelson, supra note 17, at 595; Stephanopoulos, supra note
62, at 107-08 ("In order to determine how the VRA applies to vote-denial claims, it thus is
necessary to turn to the case law of the lower courts-which itself is both sparse and
somewhat muddled."); New Vote Denial I, supra note 7, at 692; New Vote Denial II, supra
note 12, at 446, 448.
85. Additional evidence that the Section 2 results doctrine is unsatisfactory might be
seen in a recent Fourth Circuit decision involving a package of laws adopted by North Car-
olina. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
The litigation involved claims under Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause-the latter
of which requires a showing of discriminatory intent. See id. at 214. The trial court rejected
the claims on all counts. Id. at 219. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the trial court
on its discriminatory-intent analysis. See id. This is odd given that one would think that
reversing the trial court on its discriminatory-results analysis would be easier than on its
discriminatory-purpose analysis. After all, the former should be easier for plaintiffs to
prove than the latter.
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impact. When it comes to benefits, courts should give far greater cre-
dence to electoral regulations that expand the electorate and that
ensure an accurate count-which may quite often involve the preven-
tion of fraud-almost to the exclusion of any other government inter-
est. Second, when it comes to the benefits and harms of an electoral
law, courts should be relatively stringent in their demands for proof
of benefits and harms from both sets of litigants. Courts should not
allow the government to get away with hortatory statements of the
benefits of an election law and not allow plaintiffs to get away with
weak, theoretical proof of disfranchisement of minority voters."
The proposed test would be superior to the current mishmash
framework for several reasons. The cost-benefit test outlined above
would be more administrable, focused on factors that should be of
utmost concern in analyzing racial fairness in elections, be faithful
to the compromise forged between liberals and conservatives in the
adoption of the Section 2 results standard, and perhaps represent a
more honest reflection of what courts may be doing sub silentio an-
yway. Of course, the proposal has potential flaws that will also be
explored.
A. The Basic Framework
The basic premise of the proposed framework is that a court
should employ a cost-benefit analysis when it comes to assessing
whether an electoral law results in vote denial under Section 2. The
benefit of the electoral law will be measured by the government justi-
fications for the law, and the harm of the law will be measured by the
cost it has on participation by minority voters. If the harm outweighs
the benefit, the electoral law will violate Section 2. But a couple of
additional, important layers should be noted to the cost-benefit anal-
ysis. First, certain benefits and certain costs should be prioritized
almost to the exclusion of all others. Second, courts should be strict in
requiring proof from both sides in demonstrating the benefits and
costs of an election law.
86. Other commentators-including Janai Nelson, Steve Pershing, Daniel Tokaji, and
Christopher Elmendorf-have made proposals for Section 2. In some instances, this Article
concurs with and utilizes their insights. In some instances, it departs from their views.
This Article points out some of the differences between my position and those commenta-
tors in the footnotes for purposes of keeping the main text relatively clean. The first com-
mentator is Chris Elmendorf. Elmendorf has provided a well-reasoned and extremely de-
tailed account for Section 2. See Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 377-78. His work, though,
focuses primarily on vote dilution litigation. Elmendorf also joins with Doug Spencer to
suggest a burden-shifting framework for Section 2. See Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note
75, at 2183-85. But they admit that "[c]rafting disparate-impact presumptions for vote
denial cases is difficult" and that their ideas are "ventured tentatively." Id. at 2183.
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Prioritizing Benefits. The possible benefits of an electoral law are
potentially unlimited. An electoral law might be justified because it
leads to a more informed electorate," makes elections competitive,
reduces voter confusion, ensures an accurate result, enhances fair
processes, or levels the playing field between incumbents and chal-
lengers. Indeed, the potential benefits of an electoral law are only
limited by the creativity of the imagination of government officials
who adopt electoral laws and the lawyers who defend those laws
against Section 2 challenges.
Because of the seemingly unlimited number of potential benefits,
courts should prioritize the two most important interests in conducting
elections: 1) voter access to the ballot, and 2) ensuring an accurate
count-which may often involve regulations aimed at preventing
fraud. All other justifications for electoral laws should mostly be given
short shrift within the context of balancing benefits of a regulation
with harm to minority voters in the context of Section 2 vote denial.
The most important government interest occurs when an electoral
law increases the number of eligible voters casting ballots. An elec-
toral law bringing more voters into the system should be viewed in a
highly favorable manner under Section 2 even if it has a disparate
impact. With due respect to those who think fewer citizens should
vote, that too much voter participation in a democratic society can be
dangerous, and who harken back to the Weimar Republic for evi-
dence that high voter turnout is not invariably a positive,88 for the
most part a healthy democracy is one where more, rather than less,
people vote. If more individuals take part in elections, the electorate
will likely be more representative of the entire population.89 And if
more people vote, more people will feel better about themselves in
terms of their civic participation.90 Thus, an electoral law increasing
87. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969) (describing a poten-
tial government interest in limiting the franchise to those who are directly interested in an
election because they will more likely acquire the information they need to cast an in-
formed vote).
88. See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING 68-73 (2011); H. B. Mayo, A
Note on the Alleged Duty to Vote, 21 J. POL. 319, 321 n.4 (citing the Weimar Republic as
evidence of the dangers of high voter turnout); Selwyn Duke, Why Most Voters Shouldn't
Vote, Am. THINKER (Mar.4, 2008), http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2008/03/
why-most votersshouldntvote.html [https://perma.cc/YVK5-XVS4]; Gary Gutting,
Should Everybody Vote?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
04/25/opinion/should-everybody-vote.html [https://perma.cc/2EWS-NMSU].
89. Michael J. Pitts, Opt-Out Voting, 39 HOFSTRAL. REV. 897, 917 (2011); see Gutting,
supra note 88.
90. See Gutting, supra note 88 ("I may want [to vote] to express my solidarity with
everyone who favors my candidates, to support the democratic process in general, to set an
example that will encourage others to vote, or even just to feel the personal satisfaction of
having voted.").
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voter participation should be given the most credence in a Section 2
analysis.
The other important government interest is ensuring an accurate
count which may often come in the form of regulations intended to
prevent fraud. Democracy requires not only that an election be broad-
ly accessible but that an election accurately reflect the will of the
electorate. If the wrong winner is declared, particularly because of
fraud, then an election is not legitimate. Thus, regulations that en-
sure accuracy in elections should be given great weight in balancing
the benefits of a law with the harm to minority voters.
While an electoral regulation might be justified apart from in-
creased access and accuracy-such as by cost-savings or ensuring the
orderly conduct of elections-these justifications should be given very
little respect except in outlier circumstances. Access and accuracy are
of paramount importance when it comes to elections. Everything else
should fall deep into the background because access and accuracy are
the only areas that might possibly justify the harm of disparate vote
denial on minority voters. If an electoral law only creates a more in-
formed electorate but leads to disparate disfranchisement of minority
voters, then that should be unacceptable. To reiterate that point be-
cause it is important, I am absolutely not saying that there are no
other possible government interests out there or that governments
should not be able to implement electoral laws for other reasons.
What I am saying is that if the government has an electoral law that
harms minority voters, the government should basically be limited to
two justifications to support the law-access and accuracy.'
Prioritizing Harms. The plaintiff in a Section 2 vote denial case
will need to prove the electoral law harms minority voters. Undoubt-
edly, this will be done by using evidence that the challenged electoral
law has a disparate impact on minority voters. Section 2 requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate that a minority group has "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."9 2 The need to
demonstrate "less opportunity" would seem to require a plaintiff to
present evidence of disparate impact, and it appears that courts al-
ready universally require such proof.9 3
But the requirement of evidence of disparate impact should not
end the inquiry into the harm. The harm of an electoral law with a
91. Arguably, four areas should be carved out where the government could engage in
vote denial involving traditional qualifications of citizenship, age, incarcerated felons, and
eligibility to vote in special purpose districts. See supra note 24.
92. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
93. See id.; see supra note 58.
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disparate impact can be assessed in different ways. For instance,
consider a city with a 20 percent minority population. Assume an
electoral law results in twenty-two lost votes for minority voters and
seventy-eight lost votes for nonminority voters. There are several dif-
ferent ways to characterize the harm:
* One could focus on the total number of minority votes lost: 22.
* One could focus on comparing the total number of minority
votes lost with the total number of nonminority votes lost: 22
versus 78.
* One could focus on the disparity between the number of minori-
ty votes lost and nonminority votes lost relative to their per-
centage of the population: 2.94
* One could focus on the disparity between the percentage of mi-
nority votes lost and the percentage of minority voters in the
total population: 2 percentage points.
In assessing the harm, courts should prioritize the raw number of
minority votes lost because of both the potential impact on outcomes
and the overall individual harm. The raw number of voters disfran-
chised should be foremost in the analysis because the more actual
votes lost, the more likely it is that those votes might make a differ-
ence to the outcome of the election. If 50,000 minority votes are lost
then that is likely to make more of a difference in an election than if
1,000 minority votes are lost.9 5 In addition, the more actual votes lost,
the greater the amount of individual harm to minority voters regard-
less of whether outcomes are impacted. The primary value of an in-
dividual voting is, in essence, the intangible "good feeling" it brings
to the voter. Voting empowers people and, among other things, allows
them to affirm their role in society-and that is important.9 6 So the
greater the absolute number of minority voters denied the individual
right to express themselves through the process of casting a counta-
ble ballot in an election, the more reason to strike down an electoral
law.97
94. Obviously, no disparate impact exists if twenty minority votes are lost and eighty
non-minority votes are lost.
95. Of course, if it is 1,000 votes lost in a 2,000 total vote election, that could make a
difference. Thus, the framework would allow for plaintiffs to demonstrate the number of
lost votes was high in relation to the specific jurisdiction. In other words, plaintiffs would
have a better chance of success with a local law that disfranchised 1,000 persons in a town
than a state law that disfranchised 1,000 persons in a state.
96. See Gutting, supra note 88.
97. In proving harm, the framework mandates a showing of a disproportionate impact
and seeks proof that minority persons will not actually cast a ballot. On this score, two
objections might be raised. The first is that Section 2 applies to "abridgment" of the right to
vote, as well as denial of the right to vote, so that outright denial should not be a require-
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But that is not to say relative rates of disfranchisement have no
role to play whatsoever-it is just that relative disparities should
play a secondary role to absolute numbers. To take an example, let us
posit a situation where there are a million citizens with 20 percent of
them being minority voters. And let us posit an electoral law that dis-
franchises 1,000 minority voters and 1,000 nonminority voters. The
law has a disproportionate disfranchising impact as 50 percent of the
disfranchised voters are minority as opposed to minority voters being
just 20 percent of the overall voters. But the loss of votes is unlikely
to have an impact on the outcome in such a large electorate," and
while there are harms to individual voters' dignity, they are not as
high in the aggregate as a loss of 50,000 votes. (Of course, a relatively
low disfranchising impact could be enough to support a successful
Section 2 claim if the government has little interest in the regula-
tion.) The main point here is that the analysis should value the total
votes denied more than the amount of the disparity, not that the
analysis should ignore disparate impact entirely.
Evidentiary Demands on Both Sides. Governments will assert the
benefits of electoral laws. Plaintiffs will counter with the harms. Both
sides will have the incentive to inflate the benefits and harms. How-
ever, courts should be very demanding of both sides in insisting on
tangible proof of benefits and harms.
When it comes to the government interest, courts should be de-
manding in requiring proof that the electoral law actually accom-
ment. Rather, laws that inconvenience voting should be enough to win a Section 2 claim. 52
U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012). The second is that demonstrating vote denial will mandate a
showing that a particular electoral law causes a lower overall turnout for minority voters.
With regard to the distinction between "abridgment" and "denial," it is unclear whether
much of a distinction truly exists. If an electoral law "abridges" the right to vote and leads
to actual vote denial, then we should be concerned about it from the standpoint of Section
2. But if an electoral law "abridges" the right to vote but does not lead to actual vote denial,
why should we care about it? The focus should be on actual harm. In my view, the term
"abridgment" captures laws that might indirectly deny voting rights, such as at-large elec-
tions or discriminatory redistricting plans-which are the bread and butter Section 2
claims. Abridgment should not be used as a term that signifies the need to provide less
evidence of actual vote denial. To use a concrete example, if the government imposes a
photo identification law that places a burden on a person to get a photo identification, but
that person gets the identification and votes, the framework here would not capture this
scenario as a cognizable wrong for Section 2 vote denial purposes.
As for demonstrating lower overall turnout, the requirement of showing disparate im-
pact might not be much different from demonstrating a reduction in turnout. For example,
if a certain type of voting machine disparately rejects votes from a minority group then,
presumably, minority turnout (in terms of actual votes counted) is lower. Or, if a post-
election survey of nonvoters shows that minority registrants disproportionately did not
vote because they lacked the required identification then, presumably, minority turnout
has been reduced.
98. Assuming complete racial polarization in voting, the loss of 1,000 votes on either
side should not swing the election, as each side would lose an equal number of votes.
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plishes the government interest. For instance, if a government as-
serts accuracy through the prevention of illegitimate votes (whether
the votes are intentionally fraudulent or just accidentally incorrect)
as its interest, courts should be fairly strict in seeking proof that the
electoral law actually does prevent illegitimate votes. If the proof is
not strong, courts should deeply discount the government benefit,
perhaps to the point of irrelevancy. To take what is likely the para-
digmatic example in the current context of vote denial, a photo iden-
tification law should actually lead to fewer instances of fraud rather
than allowing for the government to assert that the opportunity for
fraud exists due to fraudulent names on the voter rolls.99
As the above example suggests, courts should also be particularly
demanding in requiring proof when the government asserts that an
electoral law will lead to a benefit in some indirect way. One way an
electoral law could lead to more voters casting ballots is through a di-
rect impact. An example of a law that might have a direct impact on
increasing the number of votes cast would be a switch to a vote-by-
mail system rather than a system where voters generally have to pre-
sent themselves at a polling place.'0 0 In contrast, more voters could
cast ballots because of less direct effects of an electoral law, such as
voters casting more ballots because the electoral law gives them more
confidence in the system. For example, if a state switched from elec-
tronic machines with no voter-verified paper trail to a system with
such a paper trail, it might cause more individuals to vote because
they would have more confidence that their vote counted.' 0 '
In general, courts should heavily discount claims of indirect im-
pact. 102 When, say, the assertion is that the number of voters will in-
99. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192-94 (2008).
100. Elizabeth Bergman, Voting Only By Mail Can Decrease Turnout. Or Increase It.
Wait, What?, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/12/21/voting-only-by-mail-can-decrease-or-increase-turnout-wait-what/?
noredirect=on&utmterm=.4d7c22e9e013 [https://perma.cc/4TDJ-96CL].
101. See Alec Foote Mitchell, Paper Trails and Audits Can Boost Confidence in Elec-
tions, BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR. (Aug. 12, 2015), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/paper-trails-
and-audits-can-boost-confidence-in-elections/ [https://perma.cc/8W8F-7M64].
102. This goes for any governmental assertion where the claimed impact is a tangen-
tial, rather than a direct, impact on access or fraud. For instance, an electoral law might be
justified because it increases the efficiency of checking in voters and, therefore, has the
potential to lead to shorter lines. This is all well and good, but a court should not accept
"shorter lines" as a justification and leave it at that. Instead, a court should demand some
proof that (1) the regulation actually does shorten the line in more than a trivial manner,
and (2) that the amount of time the line will be shortened will actually lead to more people
casting ballots. It is an open question whether long lines are much of a deterrence to vot-
ing. The people who wait the longest would appear to be the people who are most passion-
ate about making their votes count (early voters and voters who arrive on election day
when the polls open). See Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 2012 4, 21-22 (MIT Politi-
cal Sci. Dept., Working Paper No. 2013-6, 2013), https://poseidon0l.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
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crease because of an increase in voter confidence in the electoral sys-
tem, courts should demand strong proof that the electoral regulation
leads to increased confidence which, in turn, leads to increased
votes.'0 3 Put simply, courts should not take claims of indirect bene-
fits-such as increased voter confidence leading to greater participa-
tion-at face value.
But courts should be just as demanding from plaintiffs in requir-
ing proof of harm and should not simply accept assertions of dispar-
ate impact and disfranchisement. A plaintiff should be required to
generate evidence that a particular electoral law does, indeed, have a
disparate impact. And a plaintiff should demonstrate that an elec-
toral law does not just provide an opportunity for disfranchisement,
but that it actually does translate into lost votes. (In the same way, a
government interest should not be accepted because of a theoretical
"opportunity" for fraud without showing that actual fraud exists.) 0 4
To take a paradigmatic example from the voter identification context,
courts should not just accept plaintiffs' showing that some registered
voters do not have an acceptable identification. Instead, they should
demand a showing that registered voters without adequate identifi-




4005103014004080003087116&EXT=pdf (documenting that those who voted early waited
the longest).
103. Indeed, in many instances, increases and decreases in confidence in elections may
merely reflect partisan bias. For example, one argument for strict voter identification laws
is that they increase public confidence in elections. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197. But
what appears to happen is that strict voter identification laws increase Republicans' confi-
dence in elections and decrease Democrats' confidence in elections. See Shaun Bow-
ler & Todd Donovan, A Partisan Model of Election Reform: Voter Identification Laws and
Confidence in State Elections, 16 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 340, 351 (2016) (reporting results
from a study that "suggest that if voter identification laws had any positive effects on voter
confidence, they were limited to Republicans, and any potential positive effects among
Republicans may have been offset by depressed confidence among Democrats"). In addition,
confidence in elections may largely be tied to whether the candidate you voted for wins.
Michael W. Sances & Charles Stewart III, Voter Fraud Is More Believable When Your Can-
didate Loses, U.S. POL. & POL'Y (Feb. 11, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/02/11/
voter-fraud-is-more-believable-when-your-candidate-loses/ [https://perma.cc/CKK6-SMUT]
(reporting research suggesting "voters' confidence is indeed driven by who wins-if my
candidate wins the election, I trust the process more").
104. I would not restrict litigants to only presenting proof of the government interest or
the harm to minority voters from elections within the jurisdiction. For instance, assume a
government wants to defend a law mandating strict proof of citizenship and evidence exists
that noncitizen voting is a problem elsewhere. My analysis would allow the government to
use that evidence in support of its law. Similarly, assume a plaintiff wants to demonstrate
the harm of the loss of early voting opportunities with evidence from other places without
early voting. The analysis here would allow a plaintiff to use that evidence in support of his
or her claim. That said, evidence from within the jurisdiction will be much stronger and
should be given much more credence by a court.
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B. The Benefits of the Proposal
The proposal here is a standard for Section 2 vote denial claims
that balances the benefit of the law against the harm to minority vot-
ers with a focus on access and accuracy on the benefits side and a fo-
cus on the raw number of minority voters impacted on the cost side.
The proposal also seeks to tighten the burden on both the govern-
ment and the plaintiffs in proving the benefits and costs of an elec-
toral regulation. Each side should have to provide firm proof of its
assertions related to the benefits and costs of an electoral law rather
than hortatory statements and theory.
Such a standard would be a vast improvement over the current
situation in relation to Section 2 vote denial jurisprudence for several
reasons. First, the proposal presents a clear, judicially-administrable
framework for analysis. Second, the proposal focuses the framework
on the factors we should care about the most in relation to election
administration and minority voters: An accurate election that at-
tempts to maximize participation while not disparately and substan-
tially disfranchising minority voters. Third, the proposal represents a
fairly balanced compromise between liberal and conservative posi-
tions that reflects the actual compromise forged when the results
standard was adopted. Fourth, and far less significantly, it may be a
more jurisprudentially-honest standard because it may essentially
reflect what some courts are sub silentio doing in this realm.
An Administrable Standard Primarily Focused on What Is Most
Important to Democracy. The proposal provides a clear and easily
understandable structure to the Section 2 results analysis. Current
Section 2 vote denial jurisprudence remains terribly unstructured
with many courts using the multi-layered Senate factors as the
touchstone of the analysis-at least when it comes to causation. The
proposed test totally abandons the Senate factors as a mechanism for
evaluating Section 2 vote denial claims and ditches the "I-know-it-
when-I-see-it" causation inquiry. 105 Thus, the proposal provides a
clearer structure for evaluating vote denial claims than what cur-
rently exists.
But beyond providing a more judicially-administrable framework,
the proposal also focuses on what is most important in election ad-
ministration: (1) maximizing the number of people who cast ballots,
and (2) ensuring that elections accurately reflect the will of the elec-
torate. The best election is generally an election where a lot of people
participate and where fraud or mistake does not taint the results.
105. As Christopher Elmendorf has noted, "though the permissibility of particular partic-
ipation barriers might be resolved by working through the [Senate] factors and winding up
with an unexplained judgment call, that would be odd." Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 416.
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Everything else related to the conduct of an election should be a sec-
ondary consideration. 0 6
On the other side of the equation, the proposal reflects what we
should care most about when it comes to minority voting rights in the
vote denial context: The raw number of minority voters who will be
disfranchised by a regulation that has a disproportionate impact.
Disparate impact is important, but disparate impact that does not
affect a substantial number of minority voters or does not cause
many more minority votes to be lost than nonminority votes should
not be of primary concern. And disparate impacts that do not lead to
lost votes should be of virtually no concern.
While the proposal provides a clearer structure for the Section 2
results standard, more structure does not mean the outcome of any
particular claim will never be dependent on the particular judge who
hears the claim. At the end of the day, the proposal comes down to a
balancing test, and a balancing test can always be manipulated by a
judge. For instance, when it comes to, say, the strength of the proof
offered on the question of the harm to minority voters, one judge
might find an expert witness not credible whereas another judge
might find that same witness credible. When it comes to litigation in
front of a judge, the human aspect of judging will always be a wild-
card, regardless of the doctrine developed.'o
It would be asking far too much for a Section 2 results doctrine
that cannot possibly be judicially manipulated. When it comes to
case-by-case decisionmaking, the federal judiciary could not adopt a
clear doctrinal rule for adjudication of Section 2 vote denial cases
without coming down hard on one side or the other of the contentious
debate over its creation. In other words, any clear rule that might
emerge would either err far too much on the side of striking down
electoral laws or far too much on the side of upholding them. For in-
stance, if Section 2 was interpreted to bar any electoral law that has
a disparate impact in a jurisdiction where societal discrimination ex-
ists, the interpretation would not be faithful to the balance Congress
struck in adopting the results standard-that would be erring too far
on the side of liberals. On the other hand, a Section 2 standard that,
in essence, demands proof of discriminatory intent would take things
106. Again, and it is repeated for emphasis-I am not saying that the government does
not have any other interest in the conduct of elections outside of maximum participation
and accuracy. What is being said is that these two factors are the compelling interests that
could serve to outweigh the harm of a law to minority voters.
107. And even if a doctrine provides an absolutely clear rule, that doctrine likely is
adopted because the absolutely clear rule accords with that particular judge's predilections
for how the world should operate.
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too far in the opposite direction in favor of conservatives.'0 8 Congress
passed a law that asked the federal judiciary to strike a balance be-
tween opposing ideas, and that balance must be abided by.
So the goal is not to create a test that absolutely cannot be ma-
nipulated by the judiciary- that is a fool's errand. Instead, the goal
is to create a test that focuses the judiciary (and the litigants as well)
on what really matters when it comes to structuring democracy.
When it comes to any electoral law, the utmost concern should be the
overall costs and benefits of the law. And when it comes to the Sec-
tion 2 results standard, the concern should focus on the overall costs
and benefits of the law with particular attention to the costs of the
law in relation to minority voters. Put simply, an electoral law might
be allowed to cause some harm to minority voters if it is worth it in
the grand scheme of things. Conversely, an electoral law should not
be allowed to perpetrate harm to minority voters if it is not worth it
in the grand scheme of things.
But currently, instead of focusing on the important aspects of a
given electoral law-the justification for its use and its harm to mi-
nority voters-the doctrinal standard focuses on an undefined notion
of "causation." This is demonstrated by a set of evidentiary guide-
posts that were not even developed for vote denial litigation in the
first place. Arguably, if judicial manipulation is to persist (and it
will), we should not dress it up in undefined legal jargon; instead, we
should be clear and honest about what should matter and then argue
about the existence (or lack thereof) of the things that do matter.
Adhering to the Original Liberal-Conservative Compromise. The
proposal remains faithful to the balance struck by conservatives and
liberals in enacting Section 2. Recall that in adopting the Section 2
results standard, liberals were seeking to free plaintiffs from having
to prove a difficult test of discriminatory purpose. On the other hand,
conservatives were opposed to enacting a test of proportional repre-
sentation. The vague, open-ended language adopted by Congress re-
flected a compromise that punted the issue to the judiciary.
A cost-benefit standard remains faithful to liberal prerogatives
because it does not require proof of a discriminatory purpose. A cost-
benefit standard does not require knowing what was in the hearts
and minds of government officials when they adopted the legislation.
108. In Veasey v. Abbott, the State of Texas argued for-and the Fifth Circuit reject-
ed-a test that similarly would have led to litigation outcomes favorable to state and local
governments. 830 F.3d 216, 247 (5th Cir. 2016) ("As the State would have it, so long as the
State can articulate a legitimate justification for its election law and some voters are able
to meet the requirements, there is no Section 2 violation. This argument effectively nulli-
fies the protections of the Voting Rights Act by giving states a free pass to enact needlessly
burdensome laws with impermissible racially discriminatory impacts.").
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A cost-benefit standard looks at objective factors (like the harm to
minority voters and the benefits to the government) and only objec-
tive factors when determining whether an electoral law violates the
Section 2 results standard in the vote denial context. Proof of dis-
criminatory purpose is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant.
A cost-benefit standard remains faithful to conservative preroga-
tives because it does not enforce proportional representation. In the
context of vote denial, proportional representation is, essentially,
striking down an electoral law merely because it has a disparate im-
pact. Disparate impact will be a part of the inquiry, but it will not be
the sole aspect of the inquiry. The government will be able to put
forth evidence of the benefits of its choice in response to proof of dis-
parate impact. A cost-benefit approach does not violate the conserva-
tive side of the results standard compromise.
A cost-benefit analysis in relation to Section 2 vote denial might
also be attractive to conservative and liberal judges alike. In essence,
a cost-benefit standard boils down to a test of efficiency in the con-
duct of elections while taking into consideration the particular inter-
est of minority voter participation. The former consideration of effi-
ciency may well be something that a coalition of liberal and conserva-
tive justices can agree on.o' The consideration of minority voter par-
ticipation is what the statute requires the judiciary to focus on; mi-
nority participation is what the Voting Rights Act was intended to
foster.
Jurisprudential Honesty. Finally, an assessment of costs and ben-
efits may closely mirror what is actually occurring in many of the
Section 2 vote denial cases. In one of the earliest academic articles
discussing the Section 2 results standard in the vote denial context,
voting rights litigator Steve Pershing canvassed the case law and
came to the conclusion that "what seems to be at work [in the deci-
sions] is the court's assessment of the justification for the govern-
ment's policy.""o Taking the line of thinking one step further, Profes-
109. Notably, in Crawford, discussed infra, a majority of liberal and conservative judges
agreed on a balancing framework, although they differed as to how it should be applied in a
specific case. See generally Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
110. Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access
Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1193 (2001). Pershing's article
mainly focused on a hypothetical Section 2 challenge to internet voting, using Arizona's
2000 Democratic Presidential primary as the jumping-off point. See id. at 1172-74 (describ-
ing Arizona's use of internet voting and discussing the "[S]ection 2 access question present-
ed on these facts"). After canvassing judicial opinions in the Section 2 vote denial context
and finding that the government's justification was an important aspect of the decisions,
Pershing offered the following "modest proposal" for application of Section 2 in the vote
denial context: "The more severe the racial disparity of voting access that results from a
challenged practice, the more tenuous the justification should be seen to be, even if that
justification is asserted to have nothing to do with race." Id. at 1199.
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sor Tokaji admits to the possibility that the current "causation"
framework is "a sort of under-the-table balancing of the government's
interest in the challenged practice against its vote-denying impact.""'
If such a balancing is what is really going on, then the proposal
brings the doctrine closer to the actual practice.
C. Potential Objections to the Proposal
There will likely be many objections to a proposal to use a cost-
benefit analysis that primarily focuses on the harm of disfranchise-
ment and government benefits related to access and accuracy. And
objections will likely also arise due to the standard's more stringent
requirement of actual proof of costs and benefits on both sides of the
litigation equation. Indeed, objections will probably come from all
quarters. Conservatives will not like the limitations on government
justifications. Liberals will not like the focus on raw numbers of mi-
nority voters disfranchised. Conservatives will not like putting a
more stringent burden for the government to produce proof that its
electoral law actually operates in a beneficial way. Liberals will not
like putting a more stringent burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate dis-
franchising impact. If both liberals and conservatives objected to the
proposal, this would be a positive rather than a negative because the
Section 2 results standard represents a compromise-where both
sides should be dissatisfied with whatever standard operates.
It is impossible to anticipate all the objections to the proposal, but
here are a few major potential objections. First, there may be "legal-
istic" objections-objections that the proposal is somehow unfaithful
to statutory text, legislative history, or precedent. Second, there may
be an objection that the proposal too closely tracks current Equal
Protection jurisprudence. Third, there may be a practical problem
when it comes to proof of the cost and benefits in this realm. The re-
mainder of this discussion deals with those possible objections in
turn.
Legalistic Objections. Many of the objections to the proposal seem
likely to come from a "legalistic" angle and would probably come from
both conservatives and liberals. Conservatives may criticize the
above standard for failure to adhere to some notion of what the plain
language of the statute indicates-that the statute does not expressly
speak in terms of costs and benefits. Liberals may criticize the above
standard for failure to follow language from Justice Brennan's opin-
ion in Gingles."2 But these legalistic objections should not serve as a
111. New Vote Denial I, supra note 7, at 722.
112. See infra note 118.
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barrier because Section 2 is, essentially, a common law statute, and
the Supreme Court has broad authority to develop the law in this ar-
ea as it sees fit.
The analysis starts from the following premise: Many of the tradi-
tional tools of legal analysis-statutory language, legislative history,
and precedent-are not helpful in determining the standard for Sec-
tion 2 vote denial claims. In the development of the results standard
and the initial Supreme Court precedent, there was an almost singu-
lar focus on vote dilution claims rather than vote denial claims. What
this means is that virtually any arguments relying on plain lan-
guage, legislative history, and precedent are trying to fit a round peg
in a square hole. To be sure, one can cherry-pick bits and pieces in
this realm to come to a liberal conclusion or a conservative conclu-
sion, but we should be realistic-legalistic claims in this realm are
generally inconclusive unless one is already predisposed to one par-
ticular side or the other.
Yet there are some big-picture principles emanating from adoption
of the results standard that cannot reasonably be disputed by either
liberals or conservatives. First, the creation of the results standard
focused almost exclusively on vote dilution, and those who passed the
statute gave little, if any, thought to its application in the vote denial
context. Second, despite the standard's narrow focus on vote dilution,
there is no question that the Section 2 results standard applies in
instances of vote denial. Section 2 has always applied to vote denial
claims, and there is no indication that creation of the results test in-
tended to pull the plug on Section 2's application to vote denial.
Third, adoption of the results standard was a compromise forged be-
tween liberals and conservatives that did not give much guidance at
all to the judiciary in either the vote denial or vote dilution context
beyond some very broad strokes-no Mobile-style discriminatory
purpose and no proportional representation.
This Article is firmly in the camp with UC-Davis's Chris Elmen-
dorf who has posited that passage of the Section 2 results standard
was essentially an invitation to the judiciary to develop a common
law of racially fair elections.11 3 1 would add to Professor Elmendorfs
assertion the idea that such common law cannot sway too far in one
direction or the other-too far in favor of the liberal side (plaintiffs)
or too far in favor of the conservative side (the government). But Pro-
fessor Elmendorf basically has it right: Section 2 leaves wide berth
for the Supreme Court to craft a standard as it sees fit in this realm.
(And if Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation,
it can always amend the statute.)
113. Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 383.
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Much of the discussion above dispenses with those who would
want to marry the results standard to some sort of plain-language
notion (a legal methodology generally associated with conserva-
tives)." 4 For instance, the proposal does not specifically address the
fact that the statutory language says that a violation can be proven
by the "totality of circumstances."" Indeed, the proposal leaves this
language-and all of the statutory language-by the wayside. But if
there is to be more structure to Section 2 vote denial jurisprudence,
then it cannot be married to a boundless "totality of circumstances"
analysis."
But there will just as likely be vehement legalistic opposition to
the proposal from the liberal side of the spectrum because the pro-
posal runs counter to a judicial opinion written by a liberal lion, Jus-
tice Brennan. The proposal divorces the Section 2 results analysis
from "societal discrimination"-a history of discrimination against
minority voters manifested in a lower socioeconomic status for minor-
ity voters."' This goes against the grain of the seminal Section 2 re-
114. The height of foolishness of plain-language analysis in the realm of Section 2
remains Justice Thomas's opinion in Holder v. Hall, where he argues that Section 2 does
not apply to vote dilution claims. 512 U.S. 874, 875 (1994). One must completely ignore
the context surrounding the adoption of the 1982 amendment to Section 2 to achieve this
result.
115. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012).
116. See id. A left-of-center colleague criticized the proposal for recognizing government
interests and for failing to place enough emphasis on disparate impact by focusing on the
language "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate ... to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice." Id. Again, though, that basic language was cribbed from a Su-
preme Court opinion involving vote dilution. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766
(1973) (describing the plaintiffs burden in a constitutional vote dilution case as producing
evidence to demonstrate "that its members had less opportunity than did other resi-
dents . . . to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice").
Not to mention that this language is so vague as to be virtually useless, except if you side
with a liberal view that any disparate impact is less opportunity and, therefore, all laws
that have a disparate impact violate Section 2.
117. In this respect, the proposal differs from Professor Janai Nelson who wrote an
article that focused on what types of vote denial should be considered, in the words of Sec-
tion 2, to be "on account of race." Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote
Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 585-86 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that arti-
cle, Professor Nelson identified two "core values" of Section 2: "(1) racial context matters
and (2) implicit bias counts" that allow for "deeper inquiry" into the "causal context of dis-
parate vote denial." Id. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, Professor
Nelson wants the Section 2 inquiry to focus on two things. First, courts should "examine
the historical racial context of discrimination in which contemporary race-neutral laws
operate to determine whether persistent racial inequality interacts with these laws to
cause disparate vote denial." Id. Second, that evidence of implicit bias helps inform wheth-
er disparate vote denial in violation of Section 2 exists. See id. Obviously, I disagree with
Professor Nelson as to her first point. However, I agree with her second point that evidence
of implicit bias should be considered in assessing Section 2 claims. Implicit bias is real and
does exist. And, to the extent that implicit bias exists and is traceable to disfranchisement
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sults precedent-Justice Brennan's Gingles opinion-which contains
what seems to have become the hallmark principle for finding a Sec-
tion 2 violation: "The essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and histori-
cal conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 11
Indeed, lower courts often harken back to this statement in their dis-
cussions of Section 2 vote denial." 9
But it is not clear at all to me why Section 2 vote denial claims
should remain a prisoner to Justice Brennan's sentiment. For start-
ers, it is a single sentence in a 50-page opinion. Moreover, the state-
ment appears in a case involving vote dilution, not vote denial. In
addition, it is not as if this statement was pulled from the statutory
language, from the legislative history, or from a prior Supreme Court
opinion dealing with minority voting rights-no citation follows the
sentence. Finally, as noted previously, Section 2 is a common law
statute and, thus, there is no need to be forever loyal to a single sen-
tence in a 50-page opinion more than three decades in the rear-view
mirror.
History and socioeconomic status should be immaterial when it
comes to the current disfranchisement of minority voters. If minori-
ty voters are being disfranchised now, society should not care about
how much or how substantial or how impactful a history of discrim-
ination has been. Nor should it care about why or whether minority
voters have a lower socioeconomic status. The thing that should
matter is whether a significant number of minority voters are being
disproportionately disenfranchised without adequate government
justification. The focus should be on present outcomes, not on
whether those outcomes can be traced in some way to social and
historical discrimination.o2 0
Here is a hypothetical example of why the Court should move
away from Justice Brennan's single sentence in Gingles as the touch-
stone for the Section 2 vote denial analysis. Assume a wealthy, well-
educated minority group of eligible voters arrived in a town one year
(that is, can be shown to actually cause lost votes by minority voters), it should be consid-
ered as part of assessing the harm of an electoral law under the Section 2 results standard.
118. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
119. See New Vote Denial II, supra note 12, at 454 ("[Lower courts] tend to emphasize
Gingles' statement that the 'essence' of a [Section] 2 claim is that the challenged practice
'interacts with social and historical conditions' to cause an inequality in voting opportuni-
ties." (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47)); see, e.g., Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v.
Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 2016).
120. However, it is likely that many, if not all, current outcomes were created at least
in part by historical discrimination.
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ago, and the town subsequently enacts an ordinance disfranchising a
substantial and disproportionate number of those people in town
elections. Also assume that the ordinance does not serve to increase
the electorate as a whole or increase accuracy, and there is no history
of discrimination or strong evidence of societal discrimination. Yet,
under these circumstances, the right result should be to find a viola-
tion of the Section 2 results standard because a substantial group of
voters are being disfranchised for no good reason.' 2 '
And here is another problem with societal discrimination as the
pivot point for analysis under Section 2: What about electoral laws
that expand the franchise for all people but disproportionately ex-
pand the franchise for nonminority voters? Should such laws be
struck down in any place that has societal discrimination? If not, why
not? And if the answer is "no" because of the overall benefits of the
laws, then the proposed framework does a much better job of honest-
ly analyzing the situation than a framework which revolves around
societal discrimination. 2 2
This is not to say that we should ignore the role that historical
discrimination has played in the development of American democra-
cy. And this is not to say that we should ignore the role historical dis-
crimination plays in current outcomes for minority voters. And fur-
ther, this is not to say that the history surrounding the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 should not play a role in our under-
standing of the Voting Rights Act.
But historical discrimination should only be used to justify pas-
sage of the statute itself. The reason we have the Voting Rights Act is
because we had a crisis related to minority voting rights.1 2 3 We still
have problems-though not as outrageous' 2 4-related to minority vot-
ing rights. And as long as the United States is a pluralistic nation, it
121. Granted, the hypothetical presented is probably unrealistic. If a town passes a law
with a substantial impact on a newly established minority group, it seems likely one would
be able to generate evidence of other instances of animus against the group (for example,
hate crimes, ethnic tensions in the school system, etc.) that could be classified as a "recent
history" of discrimination.
122. Courts should not engage in a less-restrictive-alternative-type analysis when ad-
judicating Section 2 vote denial claims. For example, assume a law passed in a state with
20 percent minority voters will lead to 90,000 new nonminority voters and 10,000 new mi-
nority voters. However, tweaking that law would lead to 85,000 new nonminority voters
and 15,000 new minority voters. In such an instance, judges should not enjoin the law
passed and replace it with a different law. Such a move strikes too close to the line of judg-
es becoming an electoral law legislature rather than acting in a judicial role.
123. See generally GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE (2013).
124. With due respect to those who take an opposing view, I do not think that such
recent enactments, such as reducing early voting opportunities or photo identification re-
quirements, come anywhere near what was happening in Selma, Alabama and elsewhere
in 1965.
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will likely continue to have problems related to minority voting
rights. That is more than enough reason to ingrain Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act into the democratic landscape for a long time. But
while history and societal discrimination can and should be used as a
macro-level justification for Section 2, courts should eschew a micro-
level analysis using societal discrimination as a touchstone for case-
by-case decisionmaking. 2 1
Equal Protection Overlapping Objection. Another potential objec-
tion is that a cost-benefit analysis in relation to the Section 2 re-
sults test might not be much, if at all, different from the Equal Pro-
tection framework developed in the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford
line of Supreme Court jurisprudence.' 2 6 A detailed account of this
line of jurisprudence is not necessary for development of this idea.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Anderson-
Burdick-Crawford line of jurisprudence involves balancing injury to
the electorate against governmental interests. 2 7 And when it comes
to injuries that minority groups might assert under this balancing
test, a Section 2 results standard that tracks this balancing pro-
vides nothing different.
Perhaps the framework provides nothing different for minority
voters than what an Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing analysis
125. Perhaps a benefit of retaining some requirement of an intersection of the chal-
lenged practice with social and historical conditions is the fact that it might eliminate Sec-
tion 2 challenges brought on behalf of white voters. See New Vote Denial II, supra note 12,
at 479-80 (noting that "it will generally be more difficult for white voters to show the inter-
action with social and historical conditions"). But why care whether white voters can bring
a claim under Section 2? If a government did not have a legitimate reason for systematical-
ly and disparately denying the franchise to a significant number of white voters, then Sec-
tion 2 should rectify that situation. The dignity of white voters in such a situation does not
need to be diminished because of a lack of historic discrimination. That being said, such
claims will very likely be virtually nonexistent.
126. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428 (1992); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
127. As the Court has most recently described the standard in Crawford:
[A] court evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation
[should] weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote against the "precise in-
terests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule" . .
... [We have never identified] any litmus test for measuring the severity of
a burden that a state law imposes on a political party, an individual voter, or a
discrete class of voters. However slight that burden may appear . . . it must be
justified by relevant and legitimate state interests "sufficiently weighty to justi-
fy the limitation."
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S.
279, 288-89 (1992)).
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would provide,12 but, even if that is the case, that lack of differentia-
tion is not a problem. There is nothing that says Section 2 results and
Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing must be different (at least in
the context of applying the balancing to a specific racial or ethnic mi-
nority group). 129 Remember, Congress can easily be said to have
passed Section 2 as a license to create a common law of racially fair
elections.1 3 0 It is not a problem if the common law of Section 2 devel-
ops a similar (or the same) test as the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford
balancing. The results standard adopted in 1982 was an effort to re-
verse a requirement that plaintiffs meet a stringent standard of dis-
criminatory purpose. 13' The Anderson-Burdick- Crawford balancing
test does not contain a stringent purpose standard and, indeed, con-
tains no purpose requirement at all. In addition, the Anderson-
Burdick-Crawford balancing test was an innovation that came after
passage of the results standard, so one cannot argue that those who
adopted the results standard were trying to abandon it. Moreover,
the Section 2 results standard was enacted primarily for its impact
on vote dilution litigation. Finally, to the extent that the proposal
here closely tracks Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing, this pre-
sents a useful counter-argument to those who might assert that Sec-
tion 2 is unconstitutional.
Practical Objection. The biggest barrier to the proposal is a practi-
cal one. The proposal calls upon courts to be stricter on both plaintiffs
and defendants with the requirement of proof. But both sides may
have trouble generating firm evidence of benefits and harms.1 32
The government may have trouble generating evidence that an
electoral law leads to an increase in voters or an increase in accuracy.
It can often be difficult to determine whether a given electoral law
actually causes more votes to be cast. It can also be difficult to prove
that a given electoral law actually increases accuracy by decreasing
the amount of fraud that occurs. And, on both sides, it can be difficult
to figure out the amount of the increase in votes and accuracy.
128. I think the proposal is different in that it puts primary emphasis on certain types
of benefits and harms when it comes to government interests and a certain type of harm
when it comes to minority voters. But for purposes of this discussion, this Article proceeds
from the vantage point that it is the same basic test and defends the proposal on those
grounds.
129. Anderson-Bu rdick-Crawford balancing is certainly different than the proposed
Section 2 standard because the Anderson-Burdick-Crawford balancing does not require
proof of racial or ethnic harm (that is, any group of voters can bring such a claim).
130. Elmendorf, supra note 7, at 383.
131. Supra Part I.A.
132. It is doubtful that requesting more concrete proof would lead to much higher liti-
gation expenses. Presumably, both sides would need to hire experts to present proof. But
experts are already a part of existing Section 2 vote denial litigation.
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On the other hand, plaintiffs may have difficulty demonstrating
disparate impact and disfranchisement. Plaintiffs may not have read-
ily available data on voters by race and ethnicity.'3 3 Even if they do,
they may not be able to trace a given electoral law to disfranchise-
ment of minority voters. This may be particularly problematic for
challenges to a newly enacted law prior to implementation of the law
(though, in truth, the government may have trouble justifying a law
that has not been implemented as well).
Frankly, the problems of proof are a positive rather than a nega-
tive of the proposal. If there are truly government benefits to be had,
the government should be able to prove that. If there is truly disfran-
chisement of minority voters, the plaintiffs should be able to prove
that as well. If a side cannot generate the actual data to prove a
claim, then maybe that claim is not worthy. There have often been
calls for election administration to take a more data-driven ap-
proach. 3 4 Why not compel electoral law litigation to take a more da-
ta-driven approach as well?
It is tiring how both sides make vast claims with very modest
proof to back up those claims. Again, take voter identification litiga-
tion as a prime example. Republicans and conservatives claim that
voter impersonation justifies the strict photo identification laws
without much proof any such fraud exists.1 3 5 Or they justify photo
identification laws based on the opportunity for fraud because of
bloated voter registration rolls or voter registration fraud.1 3 6 On the
other hand, Democrats and liberals make vast claims of disfran-
chisement, mostly citing data on how many registered voters do not
have a qualifying identification without tying that into people actual-
ly not turning out to vote because of the photo identification law.137
133. One of the problems of proof in Section 2 cases is that not all states gather data on
registered voters by race and ethnicity. A federal statute should be enacted to require
states to gather such data.
134. See generally HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION
SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO Fix IT (2009).
135. JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD, 1, 4
(2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Theo20Truth%/20About%/
20Voter%2OFraud.pdf ("It is more likely that an individual will be struck by lightning than
that he will impersonate another voter at the polls.").
136. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
137. See Michael J. Pitts, Photo ID, Provisional Balloting, and Indiana's 2012 Pri-
mary Election, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 944-45 (2013) (discussing data used by opponents
of photo ID); see also Tom Kertscher, Were 300,000 Wisconsin Voters Turned Away From
the Polls in the 2016 Presidential Election?, POLITIFACT WIS. (Dec. 7, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2016/dec/07/tweets/were-300000-wisconsin-
voters-turned-away-polls-201/ [https://perma.cc/5HB6-PRDR]. To date, the best evidence
available demonstrates that almost no voter impersonation fraud occurs and that there is
some amount of disparate disfranchisement of minority voters but that the claims of actual
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Let us put both sides to the test and be equally skeptical of claims of
benefits and harms-in all contexts.
That said, the proposal would not necessarily require the gov-
ernment to prove that a specific law actually increased turnout
among all voters or minority plaintiffs to prove that a specific law
actually decreased turnout among minority voters. It may be very
difficult to credibly determine whether a given electoral law either
increases or decreases turnout. Instead, both sides should be al-
lowed to present witnesses to justify their claims. For instance, if
the government wanted to argue that access was increased, it could
present witnesses to testify as to how a given electoral law enabled
voter participation. On the other hand, if a plaintiff wanted to argue
that disfranchisement occurs, a plaintiff could provide actual per-
sons as witnesses who were disfranchised. Of course, though, in
each instance both sides are going to have to provide more than one
witness if they are going to make claims of a substantial impact one
way or the other.
In addition, as a general matter, both sides would not necessarily
be required to prove their claims with evidence from the jurisdiction
in question. While evidence from the jurisdiction in question will be
the most compelling, evidence of what has occurred in other jurisdic-
tions could be used to support a claim. For instance, if the claim is
that the adoption of vote centers in one state will increase the num-
ber of people who vote, evidence that the adoption of vote centers in
another state has increased the number of people who vote should be
considered. 3 8
At the end of the day, no framework for Section 2 can ever be per-
fect. A Section 2 results standard is always going to have to walk the
line created by the liberal-conservative coalition required for passage.
For the reasons discussed above, a cost-benefit analysis focused on
the most important aspects of democracy would be the best way to
proceed despite any potential objections to such an approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Section 2 results standard has now been operational for more
than thirty-five years. However, there still is no clear structure for
adjudicating claims of vote denial using the results standard. At
disfranchisement tend to be overblown. In the face of such evidence, though, the proposed
framework would likely invalidate the vast majority of strict photo identification laws.
138. Of course, evidence of the impact of an electoral law from outside the jurisdic-
tion involved in the litigation may well be discounted if there are material differences
between the jurisdiction where the evidence was collected and the jurisdiction involved
in the litigation.
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some point, the Supreme Court will step into the mix. When the
Court steps in, it should craft a standard that remains faithful to the
liberal-conservative compromise that allowed for the creation of the
results standard in the first place. It should also create a standard
that focuses on the most important aspects of participation: An accu-
rate election system that maximizes participation. The framework
offered in this Article provides both.
